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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1668 
_____________ 
 
GEN LIN, 
              Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
              Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A087-438-534) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Roger C. Harris 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2012 
 
Before:   SCIRICA, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 27, 2012) 
_______________ 
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Zhou Wang 
P. O. Box 130182 
New York, NY  10013 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr. 
Stuart F. Delery 
Ernesto H. Molina, Jr. 
Kate D. Balaban 
Jamie M. Dowd 
Thomas W. Hussey 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice 
P. O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Gen Lin petitions for review of a February 23, 2012 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. For 
the following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
 
I. Background 
 
Lin is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of 
China.  He entered the United States illegally on or about 
May 15, 2004, across the Mexico-Texas border.  On 
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December 12, 2008, he was served with a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”) before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), and he has 
conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  To 
avoid removal, Lin petitioned for asylum, for withholding of 
removal, and for protection under the Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”).   
 
In support of his petition, Lin asserted that he fled 
China to escape religious persecution he suffered because of 
his Christianity.  Lin claims that he joined a Christian church 
in China and was baptized there on June 22, 2003.  He says 
that on October 18, 2003, he was detained for five days in a 
Chinese detention center for practicing his religion, and that 
he was interrogated about his church, severely beaten, and 
deprived of water and sleep.  According to Lin, after his 
family paid a fine and he was released from detention, he 
continued to fear persecution and decided to leave the 
country.  He chose to come to the United States because it “is 
a country … [where] you have freedom to believe and 
practice your religion.” (J.A.  at 181.)  He testified that he still 
practices Christianity and would continue to practice if 
removed to China.   
 
On August 23, 2010, the IJ denied Lin relief and 
ordered him removed to China.  That decision was based on 
Lin’s failure to file his petition for asylum within one year of 
his arrival, and on an adverse credibility determination.  The 
IJ found Lin’s testimony unworthy of belief largely because 
Lin had failed to provide corroborating witness testimony, 
despite having relatives in the United States, fellow 
congregants at his church, and an eight month delay in 
removal proceedings in which to collect evidence.  Lin’s 
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appeal of the IJ’s decision was denied by the BIA on 
August 25, 2011.   
 
Lin filed a timely motion asking the BIA to reopen 
proceedings in his case.  He claimed to have previously 
unavailable evidence showing that he is now wanted for arrest 
in China for his religious practices.  Lin submitted a copy of a 
summons for his arrest allegedly issued on September 5, 
2011, by the “Public Security Bureau” of his hometown, after 
both the IJ’s August 2010 order and the BIA’s August 2011 
denial of appeal.  (J.A. at 23.)  He also provided 
documentation of a friend’s arrest in China for practicing 
Christianity, and letters from that same friend and from Lin’s 
sister corroborating that Lin is currently wanted for arrest.  
Finally, he provided a document allegedly from government 
authorities in his hometown warning students and teachers 
against “involvement in illegal religious activities” (Id. at 62-
63), and a number of photographs purportedly showing that 
he continues to practice Christianity.  Lin did not, however, 
explain how he obtained this new documentation, nor did he 
note any efforts to authenticate it.  Lin also failed to file a 
new application for asylum.   
 
The BIA held that Lin did not satisfy his burden of 
showing prima facie eligibility for relief, and it denied his 
motion to reopen.  In particular, it noted that there was no 
indication of how Lin had acquired the new documents from 
Chinese sources, nor had Lin made any attempt to 
authenticate them.  The BIA’s denial was ultimately based on 
the totality of the circumstances, which included Lin’s failure 
to file a new application for asylum, his reliance on 
unauthenticated evidence, and the IJ’s prior adverse 
credibility determination.   
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This timely petition for review followed. 
 
II. Discussion1
 
 
We review for abuse of discretion a decision declining 
to reopen removal proceedings.  INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 
314, 323-24 (1992); Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 
409 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under that standard, we give the BIA’s 
decision broad deference and generally do not disturb it 
unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Filja v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  We also note at the outset 
that “[m]otions for reopening of immigration proceedings are 
disfavored,”  Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323, and that “[g]ranting 
such motions too freely will permit endless delay of 
deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to 
continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case,”  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108 
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
There are three substantive grounds upon which the 
BIA may deny a motion to reopen immigration proceedings.  
First, a motion may be denied when the movant fails to 
establish a prima facie case for the relief sought.  Id. at 104.  
Second, it may be denied when the movant fails to introduce 
previously unavailable and material evidence.  Id.; see also 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall 
not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence 
sought to be offered is material and was not available and 
                                              
 1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
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could not have been discovered or presented at the former 
hearing.”).  Finally, when the ultimate relief sought is 
discretionary, as with asylum or withholding of removal, “the 
BIA may leap ahead, as it were, over ... threshold concerns ... 
and simply determine that even if they were met, the movant 
would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.”  
Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105.  The  BIA may also deny a motion to 
reopen immigration proceedings on certain procedural 
grounds, including failure to file an accompanying 
application for relief.  Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that it is within BIA’s discretion to deny a 
petition based on petitioner’s failure to file accompanying 
petition for relief); see also In re Yewondwosen, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 1025, 1026 (BIA 1997) (en banc) (explaining that failure 
to file an accompanying petition for relief will generally 
result in denial of petitioner’s motion).   
 
Here, the BIA’s decision to deny Lin’s motion to 
reopen his immigration proceedings was based on both 
substantive and procedural grounds.  Substantively, the BIA 
concluded that the adverse credibility determination against 
Lin and his reliance on unauthenticated documents prevented 
him from establishing prima facie eligibility for relief.  
Procedurally, Lin failed to submit a new application for 
asylum, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.  Either the 
substantive or the procedural ground, if well-founded, is 
sufficient to deny Lin’s motion to reopen. 
 
 A. Authentication of Documentary Evidence 
 
 To establish a prima facie case for asylum, an 
applicant “must produce objective evidence that, when 
considered together with the evidence of record, shows a 
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reasonable likelihood that he is entitled to relief.”  Huang v. 
Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  On a motion to reopen removal proceedings, that 
evidence must be shown to have been unavailable and 
undiscoverable during the previous proceeding.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Although 
the alien bears the burden of proving eligibility for the 
requested relief, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.(c)(1), the BIA “must 
actually consider the evidence and argument that a party 
presents,” Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), even 
though it need not expressly parse each point.  Id. at 268.        
 
 Federal regulation requires that documents submitted 
in support of an asylum petition be properly authenticated.  8 
C.F.R. § 1287.6.  Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 requires that 
official records, such as the arrest warrant that Lin submitted, 
be “evidenced by an official publication” or “certified by an 
officer in the Foreign Service of the United States, stationed 
in the foreign country where the record is kept.”  Id.  None of 
the documents that Lin submitted met that requirement.  As 
Lin correctly notes, however, we have held that § 1287.6  “is 
not an absolute rule of exclusion.”  Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 
529, 532 (3d Cir. 2004).2
                                              
 2 The regulation we interpreted in Liu was 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.6, which contained identical language to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1287.6.  The discrepancy in numbering is the result of the 
transfer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 
functions to the Department of Homeland Security in March 
2003.  8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(c).  There is no difference in 
substance between the two provisions.   
  Recognizing that “asylum 
applicants can not always reasonably be expected to have an 
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authenticated document from an alleged persecutor,” id., we 
concluded in Liu that they must sometimes be allowed to 
“attempt to prove the authenticity … through other means … 
.”  Id. at 533.  We emphasized that exceptions to the standard 
authentication requirement are especially necessary when the 
petitioner attempted to comply with the regulations but 
“failed due to lack of cooperation from government officials 
in the country of alleged persecution.”  Id.    
 
 We have therefore previously granted petitions for 
review where the petitioner attempted, but failed, to 
authenticate documents, or otherwise demonstrated that it was 
not reasonable to expect the petitioner to provide 
authenticated documents.  In Liu, the petitioner’s counsel 
attempted to authenticate abortion records from China, but 
found that authentication was impossible because Chinese 
officials reported that they do not authenticate such 
documents.  Id. at 530.  Similarly, in Leia v. Ashcroft we 
remanded a BIA decision when the petitioner did not follow 
authentication procedures but presented other evidence 
demonstrating that proper authentication would be 
impossible.  393 F.3d 427, 435 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining 
that it was abuse of discretion for BIA to refuse to consider 
expert testimony about political conditions in petitioner’s 
country of origin that made authentication impossible).  
 
Lin argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing 
to allow him to authenticate the documents in a manner other 
than that prescribed in 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6.  He does not claim, 
however, that any such attempt to authenticate was actually 
made.  Nor does he provide any evidence to suggest that 
authenticating those documents would have been impossible 
or otherwise unreasonable, as the petitioners did in Leia and 
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Liu.  See Leia, 393 F.3d at 435; Liu, 372 F.3d at 533.  In those 
cases, we did not lift the burden from the petitioner to 
establish a prima facie case for relief with authenticated 
documents.  Rather, we held that, in some circumstances, 
authentication can be established through means other than 
the methods specifically delineated in § 1287.6.  Leia, 393 
F.3d at 435 (allowing petitioner to “prove authentication by 
other means”); Liu, 372 F.3d at 533 (holding that the official 
methods of authentication are not the “exclusive means of 
authenticating records before an immigration judge”).  Lin 
has evidently made no effort to establish the authenticity of 
his documents through any means, yet he asserts that the BIA 
has abused its discretion by denying him the opportunity to 
do so now.  Essentially, he argues that he deserves a second 
bite at the apple, without providing any justification to excuse 
his failure to meet his initial burden.         
 
It is true that we have remanded cases to the BIA for 
further consideration of the authenticity of documents, but 
only when the BIA’s denial of a motion or appeal was based 
solely on the petitioner’s failure to follow the official 
procedures or lacked any consideration of the individual 
documents.  See Huang, 620 F.3d at 391 (remanding where 
BIA rejected all newly submitted evidence as cumulative 
without considering the evidence); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 
434 F.3d 627, 636 (3d Cir. 2006) (vacating a BIA order on 
direct appeal in part because “the IJ refused to give any 
weight to unauthenticated documentary evidence on the basis 
of [§ 1287.6] alone”); see also Liu, 372 F.3d at 533 (holding 
that it was legal error for the IJ to reject documents on the 
sole ground that they did not meet the specific authentication 
requirements in the regulation).  Here, the BIA did not deny 
Lin’s motion solely on the ground that he failed to follow the 
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authentication procedure in § 1287.6, and it did not 
summarily reject his evidence.  Rather, the BIA questioned 
the authenticity of his documents because there was “no 
indication as to how the documents from Chinese sources 
came into [his] possession … .”  (J.A. at 3.)  The BIA also 
noted that the photographs Lin submitted were taken at 
“undisclosed times and locations,” which prevented them 
from convincingly demonstrating that he had recently been 
engaged in church activities.  (Id.)  In the context of the IJ’s 
prior adverse credibility determination, the BIA considered 
those deficiencies sufficient to prevent a prima facie showing 
of eligibility for relief.3
                                              
 3 Prior adverse credibility determinations are not 
always relevant on motions to reopen.  In Guo v. Ashcroft, 
this Court held that when a prior credibility assessment is 
“utterly unrelated” to a later asylum claim, that assessment 
cannot justify subsequent denials of relief.  386 F.3d 556, 562 
(3d Cir. 2004).  But that is not the case here.  Lin’s adverse 
credibility determination was based on his failure to provide 
evidence corroborating his Christian faith and religious 
persecution.  Unlike the petitioner in Guo, who incurred an 
adverse credibility determination with regard to her claim of 
religious persecution and then filed a motion to reopen based 
on China’s family planning policy, Lin’s initial application 
and motion to reopen are based on the same underlying basis 
for asylum: religious persecution.  The BIA could thus rely on 
the prior credibility determination if it chose to do so.  See 
Huang, 620 F.3d at 389 (explaining that the evidence of 
record is considered along with the new evidence in 
determining whether the petitioner has established a prima 
facie case for relief).  
  We cannot say that that conclusion 
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was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Filja, 447 F.3d 
at 251 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
In sum, the BIA considered the newly presented 
evidence and found it insufficient to establish a “reasonable 
likelihood that [Lin] is entitled to relief,” Huang, 620 F.3d at 
389, because Lin failed to established its authenticity.  Given 
the heavy burden on a party moving to reopen removal 
proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lin’s motion on that basis.        
 
 B.  Failure to Submit a New Application for Asylum 
 
Even if Lin had established a prima facie showing of 
eligibility for relief, the BIA appropriately denied his claim 
on procedural grounds.  Federal regulations require that “[a] 
motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting 
an application for relief must be accompanied by the 
appropriate application for relief and all supporting 
documentation.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  The BIA has held 
that “failure to submit an application for relief … will 
typically result in the Board’s denial of the motion.”  In re 
Yewondwosen, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1026.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, the Attorney General has a “legitimate 
interest in creating official procedures for handling motions to 
reopen deportation proceedings so as readily to identify those 
cases raising new and meritorious considerations.”  INS v. 
Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (per curiam).  In recognition 
of that interest, this Court has agreed that denying a motion 
for failure to comply with procedural requirements is not an 
abuse of the BIA’s discretion.  Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (3d Cir. 1986).      
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As the BIA noted in its denial of his motion, Lin did 
not submit a new application for relief with his motion to 
reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).4  (See J.A. at 
3 (“The respondent has not submitted a new asylum 
application, as required.”).)5  Lin does not contest this 
finding, and there is no indication in the record that he 
submitted the necessary application.  In light of the 
mandatory language in § 1003.2(c)(1), and in recognition of 
the BIA’s authority to enforce its procedural requirements, 
Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, we conclude that that failure alone is 
a sufficient basis to deny his petition.6
                                              
 4 Although the BIA did not specifically base its 
conclusion on this fact, it noted the lack of the required 
application and ultimately denied the motion based on the 
“totality of the circumstances.”  (J.A. at 4.) 
  In re Yewondwosen, 
 5 In his motion to reopen, Lin repeated his requests for 
asylum, for withholding of removal, and for protection under 
the CAT.  A motion to reopen proceedings on any of those 
grounds must be accompanied by “the appropriate application 
for relief … .”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).  Although the BIA 
noted only Lin’s failure to file an application for asylum, that 
observation may have implicitly recognized that Lin also 
failed to file for withholding of removal, which can be raised 
through the same application.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (“An 
asylum application shall be deemed to constitute at the same 
time an application for withholding of removal … .”).  In any 
event, Lin did not file an accompanying application for relief 
of any kind.               
6 While the BIA may rightly enforce its procedural 
requirement that a petitioner submit a new application for 
relief with his motion to reopen, that does not mean that rigid 
enforcement will always be warranted.  Cf. Lu v. Ashcroft, 
13 
 
21 I. & N. Dec. at 1026; see also Jiang, 639 F.3d at 757 
(holding that it is within the BIA’s discretion to deny a 
petition based on petitioner’s failure to file the accompanying 
petition for relief); Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 
1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the BIA “did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that Romero-Ruiz did not satisfy 
the procedural requirements” because, among other things, he 
failed to file an accompanying application for cancellation of 
removal); Palma-Mazariegos v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 144, 147 
(1st Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (concluding that failure to file an 
accompanying application for relief is “independently 
sufficient to justify the denial” of a motion to reopen); 
Waggoner v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a 
motion to reopen where the petitioner did not submit an 
appropriate application for relief).  Accordingly, the BIA did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen.   
                                                                                                     
259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (cautioning against a “strict, 
formulaic interpretation” of the procedural requirements for 
supporting a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel); Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the BIA abused its discretion by 
imposing the procedural requirement that a motion to reopen 
be accompanied by supporting documentation when 
petitioner’s counsel made diligent efforts to obtain the 
necessary materials and his failure was due, in part, to the 
administrative tribunal’s own failure to respond to counsel’s 
requests).  Moreover, the BIA retains its “clear authority” to 
reopen proceedings “in the interests of fairness and 
administrative economy,” even when other regulatory 
requirements have not been met.  In re Yewondwosen, 21 I. & 
N. Dec. at 1027.    
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III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
